As an American with long memories of 1979, I hope that the demonstrators can succeed in toppling the Iranian regime. I look forward to seeing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s liver on a stick. He was one of the ringleaders of the embassy invasion and the former hostages well remember Ahmadinejad’s fanaticism and brutality. American has gone unavenged for the insult to its flag, embassy and people and I hope the bastard pays – dearly.
Ahmadinejad, the Mullahs, the Republican Guard and the Basij should also pay for things like this (warning: graphic content):
This is Neda and her death is now viral video symbolizing the Iranian people’s struggle against tyranny. These protests are now way, way beyond a disputed election and reflect a direct challenge to the regime. The potent question is whether they can succeed and if so, what would take the regime’s place?
As to the question of whether they can succeed, Michael Rubin inclines toward pessimism and doubts whether street protests alone are enough:
Street protests in Iran are important but are themselves not enough to force change. The supreme leader will not be swayed because he considers himself accountable to God, not to the people. Indeed, even the Islamic Republic’s clerical establishment is irrelevant in this calculus. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s invocation of folk religion — his appeals to the messianic Hidden Imam, for example — is a way to bypass senior religious figures who, according to Shiite theology, will be among the greatest obstacles to the Hidden Imam’s return. Nor does the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, pay too much heed to his fellow clerics in Qom. They have always refused to bestow on Khamenei a level of religious legitimacy to match his ambition. Today, the majority of Iran’s grand ayatollahs oppose the concept of theological rule. Not by coincidence, the majority are now in prison or under house arrest.
Khamenei can weather the public’s disdain so long as the Revolutionary Guard serves as his Praetorian Guard. Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founder, formed the Revolutionary Guard to defend his revolutionary vision. It is more powerful than the army and answers only to the supreme leader. That the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Iranian public is now evident to the outside world, but it is not news to the regime. In September 2007, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the new Revolutionary Guard chief, reconfigured the force into 31 units — one for each province and two for Tehran — on the theory that a velvet revolution posed a greater threat to regime security than any external enemy. Guardsmen are not stationed in their home cities so that they do not hesitate to fire on crowds that might include family and friends.
As Rubin notes, the Iranian regime is not stupid – after the 1999 uprisings, they brought in Chinese security consultants with Tienamen experience.
In the aftermath of the protests, the Chinese government supplied security consultants to Tehran. Rather than bash heads and risk protests and endless cycles of mourning, Iranian security services began photographing demonstrations, after which they would arrest participants over the course of a month when they were alone and could not spark mob reaction. With the assistance of European businessmen, the Iranian government upgraded its surveillance of communication (and the Internet).
Only when the Republican guard begins to sway will there be cause for optimism. Until then, I share Rubin’s pessimism.
But assuming that the protesters prevail, what happens next? Will the Mullahs stay in control? Will Mousavi simply become president in Ahmadinejad’s place, or will the whole mess simply circle the drain? What happens to Iran’s nuclear ambitions?
On June 3, Dan Pipes observed that he would prefer Ahmadinejad to Mousavi as president simply because it’s better to have a president who’s viewed as a nut rather than one who might possess the subtle skills to put the world to sleep. But events have changed Pipe’s mind:
The startling events in Iran in the week since the election, however, have transformed Mousavi from a hack Islamist politician into the unlikely symbol of dreams for a more secular and free Iran. In the words of Abbas Milani, my colleague at the Hoover Institution, “If Ahmadinejad survives, it will be on the back of a Tiananmen-style crackdown. If Mousavi prevails, it will be on a wave of reformist sentiment.” While that reformist sentiment may not shake the regime and is unlikely to stop the nuclear weapons program, it does hold out hope for substantial change.
Accordingly, I no longer want Ahmadinejad to serve as president for a second term but prefer Mousavi in that position. Better yet, of course, would be for neither of them to hold power but for the entire fetid Islamic Republic of Iran to collapse. While confident that process is underway. I have no idea if it is weeks or decades ahead. Whatever it requires, Mousavi as president hastens the process.
Either way, the nuclear clock is still ticking.
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