In a prior post, I discussed the Russian Defense Ministry’s plans to downsize the Russian army. Naturally, the generals are resisting. Alexander Golts again picks up the story in today’s Moscow Times:
These unprecedented cutbacks, if actually implemented, would mean a fundamental change to Russia’s military model. With all of these changes about to take place, many opponents of reform have been asking, “Where is the new military doctrine that clearly defines Russia’s main enemy in the 21st century?”
Lo and behold, last week the Security Council created a working group for the development of a new doctrine. General Yury Baluyevsky, the Security Council’s deputy secretary, will head the group. It is clear that any doctrine produced by Baluyevsky, the former head of the General Staff who resigned in March reportedly over opposition to Serdyukov’s reforms, will not support the minister’s plans to downsize the army.
According to Golts, this resort to ‘doctrine’ is code for more military involvement in foreign affairs, with a strange reference to nuclear weaponry:
Baluyevsky has already indicated that when the new doctrine is issued, it will reflect changes in the world’s geopolitical and military state of affairs, including the greater role the military needs to play in the country’s foreign policy. He also said it would include “the legitimate use of nuclear weapons as a tool for strategic deterrence.”
Baluyevsky’s project to produce a new military doctrine is an old trick that has used by generals to bog down reforms indefinitely. This is how it works: First, they argue that a doctrine is required before any reforms can be implemented. Then they construct a doctrine suggesting that the United States and NATO are the main military threats to Russia, which jibes with many of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev’s positions. In this way, the generals can oppose Serdyukov at any moment by saying, “Your ambitious plans to downsize the armed forces violate the letter and spirit of our military doctrine.”
And for generals faced with the reality of diminished conventional capabilites, the only thing left is ultimate deterrence:
The only thing left in Russia’s arsenal is nuclear arms, and this explains Baluyevsky’s strange reference to “the legitimate use of nuclear weapons as a tool for strategic deterrence.” Within this framework, only nuclear force can serve as a deterrent. And if that is the case, it dangerously lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. I don’t think, however, that the Kremlin is really ready to start a nuclear war over some chance incident.
So, it sounds like a negotiation between the Kremlin and the generals. And the price for a smaller force is a larger role for the generals.
Swell.
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